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Lew Fincher
Hurricane Consulting, Inc.
Bill Read
Houston/Galveston Area National Weather Service Office
Introduction
It was in the dead of summer along the upper Texas
coast. The nation was rightfully preoccupied with the
events of the Second World War. All news underwent
censorship. Because of German U-boat activity expected
in the Gulf of Mexico, all ship's radio broadcasts
were silenced. This included any reports of weather
... even adverse weather such as a hurricane. Weather
Bureau forecasters in 1943 relied almost exclusively
on reports from ships at sea and land-based weather
offices in cities and airports for the data used to
issue storm warnings. Satellite imagery was 20 years
away .. radar over a decade. Aircraft reconnaissance
was soon to be born ... but not yet.
With those constraints in mind, one can see why the
hurricane that hit the Houston-Galveston area on July
27, 1943 came without adequate warning. Newspaper
accounts of the storm describe it as the "worst
since 1915." The 1915 hurricane tested the famous
Galveston seawall and killed over 275 people. The July
27, 1943 hurricane killed a reported 19 people,
injured hundreds and caused significant property
damage ($17,000,000, COE, 1972) through much of the
metropolitan area.
A continuing interest in documenting the hurricane
threat to the Houston and surrounding area has led us
to research the impact of hurricanes in our area. Our
focus has been on storms prior to Carla (1961), as
that storm and more recent events tend to be well
documented. While each storm is different and adds to
the hurricane history of the area, the 1943 hurricane
has proven to be most noteworthy to date. It is the
only one of consequence that the center tracked
directly across Galveston Bay and into Houston. The
lack of warning and, for 1943, the high population
(metropolitan area over 600,000) under the storm's
path should have created considerable data on the
impact.
Perhaps because of the war and censorship of
weather information, etc., we have, as of this
writing, been unable to dig up much "hard
official data" on the storm itself. Through
newspaper articles, insurance reports and personal
accounts found in several books on the area, we have
been able to piece together what it was like to go
through the storm and how much damage was caused. An
added historical note on this storm ... the first
documented intentional flight into a hurricane was
accomplished as the storm moved into Houston from the
bay.
Our intent in this short article is to document as
best we can what the storm was like meteorologically,
give a flavor of the impact of the storm in the
Houston and Galveston area, and perhaps jog some
memories of others in the hurricane business who may
have come across additional data on this storm.
Meteorological Aspects of the 1943 Hurricane
The official records (Neumann, et al) of the National
Hurricane Center (NHC) indicate that the 1943
Hurricane formed as a depression during the day on
July 25 southeast of Burrwood, Louisiana. The storm
moved slowly due west during the night. On the 26th,
the storm began moving west-northwest and stayed on
that course through landfall in the Galveston Bay area
during the morning through the evening on July 27. The
official record shows maximum sustained winds around
86 mph. The forward motion was slow, averaging 7 mph.
There are no references in the NHC data as to the
basis for location and strength while the storm was
over water. We assume, perhaps incorrectly,
forecasters had some access to ship reports after the
war and made estimates accordingly. Perhaps it was
extrapolated backward from known intensity at
landfall.
There is virtually no reference to the storm in
records kept at the local Houston NWS office or the
former Galveston NWS office. Again, war era
regulations did not permit release of records kept at
these offices and we were informed anecdotally that in
all likelihood any records taken would have been
classified and shipped to Washington. Most of what we
have on the storm has been pieced together from
newspaper archives from the Houston Chronicle, Houston
Post, Houston Press, Daily Sun and the Texas City Sun,
and through various local area personal histories
found in libraries. One other source of information
has been eyewitness accounts of survivors who lived in
the area. Unless otherwise noted, reference to values
of wind speed, tide height, rainfall and pressure have
come from the newspaper articles.
The first public awareness of the storm was Monday
morning, July 26, 1943. The papers carried an article
headlined "First Storm Warning of the
Season." The article went on to report the
disturbance was located "110 miles west southwest
of Burrwood, LA and moving west at 10 mph, attended by
strong winds, probably gales. The advisory called for
30-40 mph winds on the Louisiana coast Monday night
and in Texas on Tuesday. Small craft were advised to
stay in port." The Houston Weather Bureau
Meteorologist in charge at the time, C. E. Norquist,
was quoted as saying when asked about the storm,
"Don't get the people disturbed by use of the
word hurricane." As matters now stand it is a
small tropical disturbance. If it gets worse, we will
let everyone know in plenty of time."
Tuesday morning apparently little had changed as
far as knowledge on the strength of the storm. The
Houston area and upper Texas coast were advised of
"a tropical storm of minor size and
intensity" and small craft were advised to remain
in port. The first knowledge of the intensity of the
hurricane came after the storm began making landfall
on the Bolivar Peninsula east of Galveston before
noon. Wind damage reports were sent from Galveston
during the afternoon. The afternoon edition of the
Houston Press had headlines that read "Storm
Heads for Houston; Galveston Damage Light. 65 to
75-Mile Winds Due Early This Afternoon," opened
the warning that didn't arrive in time for most in the
quickly strengthening hurricane's path. At that time
citizens were advised of a "small but severe
tropical storm with winds possibly reaching hurricane
force" that would hit Houston late in the day and
overnight. The advisory came as Galveston, almost
completely unprepared, was hit by 74-mile gusts which
ripped through the island city. The report continued,
stating that the storm was centered about 15 miles
north of Galveston at 11:30 a.m. and moving
west-northwest at about 10 miles per hour.
Various accounts show that the brunt of the storm on
the coast and inland to Texas City and communities in
Galveston County occurred between noon and 4 p.m. The
strongest winds were from the north and northwest...
as the eye passed just to the east over Galveston Bay
and across the Bolivar Peninsula. Reported maximum
winds varied widely with peak gusts of 104 mph
measured in Texas City. The most common reference to
sustained wind suggested 70-90 mph. The storm surge
reported from the gulf side was surprisingly light...
only 3 to 6 feet. Most flooding in Galveston was
attributed to rising water from the bay side rather
than the gulf.
From mid-afternoon through early evening, bay area
communities from Kemah and Seabrook to the south,
through La Porte and Baytown to the north took a
direct hit from the storm as it moved inland from
Galveston Bay. Interestingly, these areas also
reported strongest winds from the northwest,
suggesting that the left rather than right side had
the most intense winds. Various accounts had winds
estimated above 70-80 mph with "certainly higher
gusts." Two utility towers over the Ship Channel,
rated to withstand 120 mph, were blown down. Again, no
tidal flooding was reported, rather, many accounts
spoke of extremely low water in Galveston Bay after
the center passed inland ... indicative of strong
north winds pushing the water out.
During the early evening to late night hours the
center of the hurricane passed through the city of
Houston. The eye was reported over downtown Houston at
11:45 p.m. It was during this period that the
anemometer at the Metropolitan Airport registered a
gust to 132 mph and had sustained winds of 85 mph for
two and a half hours. Minimum pressure recorded was
28.78" (975 mb) at Ellington Field (COE 1972)
while a minimum of 28.95" was reported at the
airport. Winds at the Weather Bureau office downtown
peaked at 56 mph. By early Wednesday morning, July 28,
the storm had weakened to a minimal tropical storm and
was located northwest of Houston near the town of
Navasota.
Rainfall from the storm was apparently quite
variable. Newspaper accounts place rainfall in the 5
to 7 inch range at most locations. La Porte recorded
17" (COE, 1972) while further east in the Port
Arthur area a report of over 19 inches was recorded.
Some of the personal accounts indicate the heaviest
rainfall began with center passage and lasted into
Wednesday. The only report of widespread serious
freshwater flooding was in the Beaumont/Port Arthur
area.
Except in the immediate path of the center of the
storm, no significant wind damage was noted. All the
data we have suggest this was a small but fairly
intense hurricane. The lack of any significant wind
reports along the coast of Louisiana and east of
Bolivar, even though the storm center was less than
100 miles from land, support this. More evidence of
the size of this storm comes from personal stories of
the sun still shining in downtown Houston at noon ...
at the time the storm was reaching Bolivar just 60-70
miles away. It also explains why the storm came
without warning. With no ship reports and no adverse
weather over land, there was no way for forecasters to
know how strong conditions were near the eye.
The lack of storm surge east of the eye at landfall
is puzzling. One possibility is that the hurricane
intensified just as it made landfall. Another is that
the storm was asymmetrical, with the stronger winds to
the left, or gulf-ward side of the track, as might be
expected from a storm moving parallel and close to
land. The strong and very gusty winds reported out of
the northwest are reminiscent of another more recent
Texas hurricane ... Celia. Interestingly, Celia moved
east to west along the Texas coast as a relatively
weak storm until just prior to landfall. Another
similar storm for this area was Alicia, which formed
off the Louisiana coast and intensified a short time
just prior to landfall. Both of these hurricanes were
also small in size.
The newspaper reports, damage photographs and
handful of actual data (975 mb and 132 mph gusts at
Ellington, the Humble Oil Refinery, and the
Metropolitan Airport, with 104 mph gusts at Texas
City) suggest to us that the storm was more likely on
the order of a category 2 at landfall (100 mph) rather
than the category 1 (86 mph) stated in the official
record. Given the storm's very small size and slow
forward motion, and using current expected reduction
of winds as it moved inland, it would be expected that
winds would have been less than 85 mph sustained at
either Ellington or the Municipal Airport by the time
the center passed over these locations if, in fact,
the storm had only 86 mph maximum winds at landfall.
Damage Accounts
Had this hurricane arrived a little farther west near
Galveston's west end, the destruction could have
become even more devastating than it was. Instead of
twenty-one people losing their lives, if it had
crossed over the island instead of the Bolivar
Peninsula, a larger storm surge would have been pushed
into the bay area, possibly causing loss of life.
People living along the northern and western shore of
Galveston Bay would have been trapped to face the
pounding waves and rising seas on land as low as five
feet above sea level in many places. Compared with the
damage that was done, who knows how bad the
destruction and loss of live would have been? In
October of 1943, the Fire Companies' Adjustment Bureau
reported about 65,000 insurance claims from this
hurricane. Recorded insured claims totalled over
$11,000,000 for the hurricane of July 27, 1943. As the
report suggested, what percentage of losses were there
that weren't insured? The Great Depression was just a
few years ago. Most couldn't afford insurance.
Galveston
The height of the seawall protected the Stewart Beach
area which is located between the gulf and the
seawall. The height of the seawall was just high
enough to block the severe wind from blowing down
those structures. People in well-constructed cottages
and tourist courts on the beach suffered little except
for becoming confined inside. Some 1,000 people
marooned in the Buccaneer Hotel near Galveston's
Seawall could see, all day on Tuesday, a sandy beach
of 75 to 100 feet beyond the seawall. This was caused
by the same strong northwest wind that brought
waist-deep floodwaters flowing from Galveston Bay into
the northern areas of the island. Later, drinking
water on the island became scarce as power to well
pumps failed. A three-story brick building that had
been abandoned due to a fire before the storm
collapsed as the winds built to hurricane strength.
Bolivar Peninsula
The eye of the hurricane came ashore across from
Galveston on the Bolivar Peninsula,. As it roared
across Bolivar, the U.S. Army's Corps. of Engineer's
hopper dredge, "GALVESTON" broke up on the
north jetty, killing two of its crew. Nearly all the
homes at Point Bolivar were leveled by the high wind.
Under normal hurricane conditions the peninsula would
have had a sizable storm surge, but because of the
movement of the storm and its strange configuration,
this apparently didn't take place.
Port Arthur
At about the same time as the "GALVESTON"
was going down off Galveston's north jetties, the sea-
going tug, "TITAN" was taking on water near
Port Arthur as it tried to make port through the
building seas and extreme wind. It had left Galveston
the day before the storm hit and was caught in the
grip of the storm as it quickly increased in wind and
seas. Four of "TITAN"'s crew drowned; three
trying to get into a rubber raft and another before
the rest of the crew made it to shore. Many of the
homes here had from 6 inches to 2 feet of water
flooding them as heavy rain (over 19 inches in some
places) fell on the right side of the hurricane. Heavy
damage to home furnishings, electric motors and
automobiles were common throughout the city.
Texas City
In Texas City, 90 percent of all structures suffered
varying degrees of damage due to wind or water.
Residents were discouraged from going to shelters due
to a polio epidemic there. Many of the plant sites
producing war materials were damaged from high winds
and water. The Pan American Refinery continued
operations throughout the storm. They considered it
too great a risk to try to shut down during the storm
and get the employees to safety. Only minor damage was
reported. The site officials were severe in condemning
the lack of adequate storm warnings.
La Porte
The eye of the hurricane crossed Galveston Bay, then
passed directly over La Porte. Pioneers of the La
Porte area, men and women who had been through all of
the hurricanes since the Great 1900 Storm, agreed that
this blow was as hard as any of the others they had
experienced. The high school's physical education
building was reduced from a three-story building to
just one floor as the wind blew out all the windows on
the north side and knocked down support beams, which
caused the roof to collapse. At nearby Morgan's Point,
a water tower was blown down. The Houston Yacht Club
was also heavily damaged. Many who lived in La Porte
who experienced the 1943 storm, and Hurricane Carla in
1961 and Hurricane Alicia in 1983, rated the '43 storm
as more destructive.
Baytown (Tri-Cities Area)
The 1943 communities of Pelly and Goose Creek are now
part of Baytown. This area may have been the hardest
hit area in the hurricane's path, as it was just north
of the eye. The huge Humble Oil and Refining Company,
now Exxon, at Baytown recorded wind gusts of 132 mph
on one of their wind anemometers. At the time of the
storm, the plant was the production leader of the
Allied Forces supply of aviation fuel. Its toluene
production was also very important to the war effort,
being an ingredient of the high explosive, TNT. At
least four large cooling towers were demolished and
along with other damage, production had to be
suspended.
Refineries at Texas City and Deer Park joined the
list of war production being suspended, as they were
also badly damaged by the hurricane. Locations along
the west and southern shore of Galveston Bay were
flooded as its waters were pushed in front of the high
winds. All over Chambers and Jefferson counties, oil
derricks went down.
Ellington Field
Ellington Field was used as a U.S. Army Air Corps.
training school for air cadets during the war. It was
located about 16 miles southeast of Houston. Many air
cadets and soldiers were injured during the storm at
Ellington Field. Hundreds of air cadets marched out
with their trouser legs rolled up to join the soldiers
on the flight ramp in staking down the planes that
hadn't been flown out in advance of the hurricane. As
the winds started to increase to hurricane force,
cadets and soldiers held onto the wings of the planes
to keep them from going airborne. At times, some of
them were working in water hip deep. Gusts as high as
132 mph were recorded by the wind anemometer located
on top of one of the hangars, just before the hangar
roof and attached anemometer blew away. At least 22 of
the cadets and soldiers ended up in the base hospital.
At lease five planes were lost.
Deer Park
In Deer Park, the Shell Oil Refinery battled against
the storm until the cooling towers started flying
apart. The strengthening winds struck here at shift
change, so many couldn't make it to the plant to
relieve those that had been there all day. Most had to
ride the storm out on site instead of being home
taking care of their families. Along with Baytown's
Humble Oil Refinery, they produced aviation fuel
needed for the Allied War effort. Without the cooling
towers, production came to an abrupt halt. Because of
quick thinking by management, a new cooling tower was
ordered as the winds were still raging. One of the
supervisors raced into Houston just ahead of the
hurricane to send out the order.
Houston
All three of the area's radio stations were knocked
off the air after losing power. Without radio, the
greater Houston area became deaf to any other
warnings. Earlier much of the telephone service and
power had already failed. Many people in downtown were
trapped where they were and took shelter in buildings
where they worked. Many took shelter in the City
Auditorium and the Coliseum along with the National
Guard Units.
Weather Advisory Confusion
Getting verification from the Weather Bureau on the
weather condition during the storm was very confusing
to many. The most confusing was the difference between
the wind velocity reported downtown and at the
airport. Houston's Weather Bureau Chief Norquest
stated that the airport instrument is an anemograph,
which records on a graph the peak velocities of a gust
as well as the valleys and pulses in the wind. The
instantaneous gust might reach 132 miles per hour for
an instant. The cup instrument is balanced out over a
tested period. He said that both instruments were
official, but served two different purposes. Because
all weather information had to be cleared through the
New Orleans office, delays in posting weather reports
were confusing. Advisories were 2 - 3 hours late
sometimes. Forecasts of the storm asked by reporters
were refused. Later as the hurricane approached the
city of Houston, barometer readings were also cut off
by the Weather Bureau.
The last official advisory which the local Weather
Bureau said would be released on the hurricane was as
follows... "Hurricane of small diameter central
1:30 C. W. T. about 30 miles west northwest of Houston
now moving only eight to ten miles per hour attended
by winds of about 70 miles per hour over very small
area near the center. Further decrease in wind
velocity near center but will probably reach 45 to 60
miles per hour in squalls in path, reaching area
around Navasota by daybreak. Indications are the
disturbance will continue west northwestward movement
during morning with gradual decrease in wind near the
center". All coastal warnings expire at 8:30 a.m.
C. W. T. Wednesday. The last advisory was released by
the local Weather Bureau at 6:30 a.m., but it was
issued at 3 p.m. Wednesday. The exact time of the 132
mile per hour gust and the several 100 mile per hour
gusts were not available from the Weather Bureau. When
asked by reporters why the times weren't available as
well as the barometer readings the day after the
storm, the reply was... "We had the records
showing the exact times, but we don't have those
records now. Do you get the distinction?"
"We had the records but disposed of them."
On the subject of the barometer readings, the
reporters were told, "It is not a time of stress
today and we are not giving out such readings."
He said it was only during periods of stress that the
Weather Bureau is advised to release barometer
readings.
Censorship Of Weather Information
The news of this hurricane was heavily censored by the
government due to national security. The loss of
production of war materials couldn't be found out by
the Axis Powers. This was 1943 and the tides in both
the Atlantic and Pacific theaters of war were finally
starting to turn. There was a report that the FBI shut
down the telegraph office in La Porte because someone
had sent a telegram out of the state informing someone
of the damages from the hurricane. The only news of
the hurricane was published in the two states that
were affected, Texas and Louisiana. After this
hurricane, never again were advisories censored from
the public. War or no war, the risk to human life is
too great. This was a lesson learned.
The First Flight Into A Hurricane's Eye
(as recalled by Lt. Colonel (retired) Ralph O'Hair)
On the morning of July 27, 1943, British pilots were
being trained in the new field of
"instrument" flying at Bryan Field by the
lead instructor, Colonel Joe Duckworth. That morning,
word spread that a hurricane was coming ashore near
Galveston and that the planes at the field may have to
be flown out for safety. Many of the British pilots
were already "aces" from earlier battles
over Europe and felt that they deserved to be trained
in the top fighters that the United States had to
offer, not this AT-6 "Texan" Trainer. When
they heard that the planes may have to be flown away
from the storm, they really started gigging the
instructors about the frailty of their trainer. The
problem was that few, if any European flyers had ever
experienced a true hurricane. They thought it was just
another big thunderstorm.
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Finally Colonel Duckworth had enough of
the ribbing and whining of these pilots and bet them
that he could fly the "Texan" into the storm
and back, showing that both the plane and his
instrument flying technique was sound. Well, the bet
was on. A highball
to the winner!
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Colonel
Duckworth and an executive officer. |
Colonel Duckworth then looked across the breakfast
table at Lieutenant Ralph O' Hair, the only navigator
at the field that morning and asked him to fly with
him. O'Hair was taken back by the bet but agreed to
fly with him, due to the respect he had for
Duckworth's skill as a pilot. Since they felt that
Headquarters wouldn't approve the flight due to the
risk of the aircraft and the crew, they decided to do
it without official permission. The main problem that
passed through Lt. O'Hair's mind was that if their
single engine quit for some reason, like being flooded
out from the heavy rain, they would be in deep
trouble. As they closed on the hurricane which was now
ashore, he thought about what it would be like if he
had to use the parachute. As they approached the storm
at a height of between four thousand to nine thousand
feet, the air became very turbulent. He described the
flight now as like "being tossed about like a
stick in a dog's mouth." The rain was very heavy
as they flew through the darkness, fighting the
updrafts and downdrafts. Suddenly they broke into the
eye of the storm. This was not the purpose of the
flight, but really an accident. The sky was filled
with bright clouds and it seemed that they were
surrounded by a shower curtain of darker clouds. As
they looked down they could see the countryside. The
storm had indeed moved inland. O'Hair described the
shape of the center as like a leaning cone. The lower
section dragged a bit behind, due to the friction from
contact with the land. The eye seemed to be about nine
or ten miles across and they circled inside. As they
exited the eye, the dark overcast and heavy rain again
pounded them until they made their way out of the
storm and back toward Bryan Field. As they arrived
back at the field, the weather officer, Lieutenant
William Jones Burdick, asked to be flow into the
storm, so O'Hair jumped out and the weather officer
flew off into the hurricane with Duckworth. After that
flight, Bryan Field became a Mecca for Allied pilots
wanting to learn the fine art of "instrument
flying". That night the bet was paid and no more
comments were given on the sturdiest of the AT-6
"Texan" trainer or the value of the
schooling of instrument flying. That was also the last
flight into a hurricane for Lt. O'Hair.
Author's Note of Thanks
I have been researching this hurricane for many years
and have been surprised how little official
information I have been able to find. My dad's family
moved to the area in the 1930s. While growing up, I
was told stories of this storm by family members.
Later as my job assignment with DuPont as the
hurricane preparedness information resource for our
coastal sites, I tried to learn more about this
hurricane. I would seek information from different
sources but usually came away with little or nothing.
I fear that in the near future, less will become know
about this strange storm, with most of the survivors
passing on. I want to thank the many "old
timers" who sat down and gave me information that
couldn't be found elsewhere. Discussing that first
flight into the eye of a hurricane with retired Lt.
Co. Ralph O'Hair was a real thrill. Special thanks to
my dad's brothers and sisters who passed their stories
of the storm to me. Fellow DuPonter and La Porte
historian Jim Counts filled many gaps about the storm
and made me realize that this hurricane was worth
researching. When I showed fellow author of this
paper, Bill Read, the MIC of the Houston/Galveston
Area National Weather Service Office, what information
I had been able to gather, he became excited and
became a great help in opening many official doors.
We would like to ask anyone with information on
this hurricane to please contact us. We are looking
for photographs, newspaper clippings, eyewitness
accounts, and official records including graphs.
Please note that this paper is just a small collection
of information that we have uncovered.
REFERENCES
THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE 26 - 30. 1943
THE HOUSTON PRESS - July 26 - 30 1943
THE HOUSTON POST - July 26 - 30, 1943
THE DAILY SUN Baytown, Texas) -
July 26 - 30, 1943
THE TEXAS CITY SUN - July 26 - 30, 1943
A Report on the Hurricane Damage of July 27.
1943 In Houston, Galveston, Beaumont Area in
Texas - Fire Companies' Adjustment Bureau,
Inc., 1943
THE HURRICANE ALMANAC - 1988 TEXAS
EDITION - Ellis, Mike - 1988
THE HURRICANE HUNTERS -
Tannehill, Ivan Ray - 1955
BAYTOWN VIGNETTES - One Hundred and
Fifty Years in the History of a Texas Gulf Coast
Community- Britt, John and Tyssen, Muriel 1992
SHELL AT DEER PARK - The First Fifty Years -
Wells, Barbara
INTERVIEW - Jim Counts, La Porte, TX
INTERVIEW- Lt. Col. Ralph O'Hair
INTERVIEW - Members of the Joseph Marvin Fincher Family
INTERVIEW - Bert Schroeder
INTERVIEW - Lynnwood Anderson
PHOTOGRAPHS - Faye Schoeder
THE NOAA LIBRARY - Miami, FL
THE NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER LIBRARY - Miami, FL
THE ROSENBURG LIBRARY - Galveston, TX
THE TEXAS ROOM OF THE CITY OF HOUSTON LIBRARY - Houston, TX
THE ROSS STERLING LIBRARY - Baytown, TX
THE LA PORTE LIBRARY - La Porte, TX
SCHRODER'S BOOK HAVEN (Rare Texana book dealer) - League City, TX
HURRTRAK EM/PRO - P. C. Weather Products
Any comments or questions of this paper can be
addressed to:
Lew Fincher
Hurricane Consulting, Inc.
P.O.Box 1426 Friendswood,Texas 77549
e-mail: Lew@HurricaneConsulting.net
Bill Read
NWS, 1620 Gill Road, Dickinson, Texas 77539;
e-mail: bill.read@noaa.gov
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